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Reforming Ratification
Ji Lian Yap*
Abstract: This paper considers recent company law reform proposals
in Hong Kong in relation to the ratification of breaches of directors'
duties, and also makes suggestions for further reform. In the course of
this discussion, comparisons will be made with the corresponding
position under the UK Companies Act 2006. Finally, several wider ob-
servations in relation to the consequences of codification of common
law principles and the divergence between English and Hong Kong
company law will be offered. The aim is to suggest directions for future
reform in the important but somewhat inaccessible area of ratification
of breaches of directors' duties. While this paper seeks to consider these
issues in the light of Hong Kong, the discussion would be of interest to
those from other common law jurisdictions who are examining the issue
of ratification or looking with interest at the recent United Kingdom
company law reform efforts and considering whether to adopt them
locally.
Keywords: ratification, directors' duties, derivative action, divergence,
Hong Kong
I. Introduction
The law relating to the ratification of breaches of directors' duties in
Hong Kong is an inaccessible wilderness of case law principles and
scattered statutory provisions. This paper considers the concept of
ratification, with particular attention to the recent law reform efforts
in Hong Kong. In the course of discussion, there will also be compar-
isons made with relevant provisions under the UK Companies Act
2006.
The paper starts by considering the rationale for allowing the rati-
fication of breaches of directors' duties. It then makes suggestions as
to who should be empowered to ratify breaches of directors' duties.
The paper also considers what the effects of ratification should be,
particularly in connection with the statutory derivative action. The
thorny issue of non-ratifiable breaches will next be discussed. Several
wider observations in relation to the consequences of the codification
of common law principles and the divergence between English and
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Hong Kong company law will be made. In the midst of the extensive
and ongoing reforms of the company law framework in Hong Kong,
the overall aim of this paper is to offer suggestions as to how coher-
ence and clarity might be improved in this nebulous area of law. This
paper seeks to consider these issues in the light of Hong Kong; how-
ever, the discussion would be of interest to those from other common
law jurisdictions who are examining the issue of ratification, or are
looking with interest at the recent United Kingdom company law
reform efforts and considering whether to adopt them locally.
II. The Rationale for Ratification
Directors' duties of care and fiduciary duties exist for the protection of
the company and its stakeholders, such as its shareholders and cred-
itors. What then is the basis for allowing the ratification of breaches
of these directors' duties? There appear to be at least two reasons for
allowing ratification of breaches of directors' duties. First, it has been
reasoned that, just as those to whom fiduciary duties are owed may
release the fiduciary from his obligation, similarly the company
should be able to release a director from his duty.' This is based
essentially on the idea of freedom of choice, that one can choose not
only whom to sue but also whom to forgive, even if this is disadvant-
ageous to oneself. In addition, from a pragmatic perspective, the
possibility of ratification may be seen generally to encourage entre-
preneurship, since there should be a means by which directors are
allowed to pursue entrepreneurial interests as long as the company
signifies its permission for this via ratification.
However, a key concern in exploring the concept of ratification is
that other stakeholders should not be unduly prejudiced at the hands
of the person(s) who have the power to ratify breaches of directors'
duties. For instance, the traditional common law position is generally
that ratification is effected by resolution of the company in general
meeting.2 The concern then is that other stakeholders such as minor-
ity shareholders and creditors should not be prejudiced by the un-
trammelled exercise of the power of ratification by the majority
shareholders. There is thus an inevitable balancing exercise that takes
place in considering the sometimes conflicting interests of the various
stakeholders of the company, to ensure that each are fairly treated.
1 P. Davies, Gower & Davies' Principles of Modem Company Law, 8th edn (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 2008) 581. Note, however, that the soundness of applying the
trust law concept of release in the corporate context has been questioned in P. Koh,
'Directors' Fiduciary Duties: Unthreading the Joints of Shareholder Ratification'
(2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 363.
2 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134.
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However, as will be argued below, there are other more direct ways of
protecting the interests of some of these stakeholders, rather than
attempting the tricky exercise of balancing all their diverse interests
within the law of ratification.
With this conceptual framework in mind, we can now turn to con-
sider two related questions, namely, who should be empowered to
ratify breaches of directors' duties, and what should be the effect of
ratification (particularly in connection with the statutory derivative
action).
In considering these questions in the Hong Kong context, only the
statutory derivative action will be discussed, despite the fact that
Hong Kong does currently still retain the common law derivative
action within its legal framework.3 The question of whether the com-
mon law derivative action should be abolished in Hong Kong had
previously been raised in law reform efforts' in the light of judicial
comments in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal to the effect that
the common law derivative action should be replaced with the statut-
ory derivative action altogether.'
III. Disinterested Shareholders' Approval
i. The Requirement of Disinterested Shareholders' Approval
The current position in Hong Kong6 is the general common law rule
that ratification may be effected by the shareholders in a general
meeting.! In addition, members are entitled to vote even if they have a
personal interest in the subject matter that is different from the inter-
ests of the company.' It follows from this that generally a director who
is a shareholder may vote on any question in a general meeting in-
cluding the issue of ratification for a breach of his duty.
However, recent deliberations in company law reform indicate that
this may be about to change in Hong Kong. It has been proposed9 that
Hong Kong adopt the UK position in section 239 of the UK Companies
3 Pursuant to s. 168BC(4) of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (hereafter:
'Companies Ordinance').
4 Chapter 9 (Common Law Derivative Action) of the First Phase Consultation of the
draft Companies Bill (17 December 2009) and the Consultation Conclusions.
5 Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas [2008] HKEC 1498 para. 32,
discussed in J.L. Yap, 'Whither the Common Law Derivative Action?' (2009) 38
CLWR 197.
6 The position in Hong Kong with regard to ratification is discussed in detail in
P. Kwan, Hong Kong Corporate Law (Lexis Nexis, 2006) para. 26.9.2.
7 Above n. 2.
8 North West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) LR 12 App. Cas. 589.
9 Part 10 (Directors and Secretaries) of the Explanatory Notes on the Draft Parts in
the First Phase Consultation of the draft Companies Bill (17 December 2009).
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Act 2006,10 which incorporated the element of disinterested share-
holders' approval into the UK legislative framework for ratification.
The intention in the draft Hong Kong Companies Bill is thus to pre-
serve the current common law on ratification with an additional
requirement of disinterested shareholders' approval."
Such an amendment would go towards preventing directors who
hold a majority vote from ratifying their own wrongdoing. Nonethe-
less, this apparently simple solution has its drawbacks. The reason for
introducing the element of disinterested shareholder approval is
based on the expectation that the disinterested shareholders will act
in the best interests of the company. However, it has been observed
that minority shareholders may not in fact necessarily act in the best
interests of the company, and may instead be motivated by concern
over the impact of litigation on the value of their shares.12
Given that the disinterested shareholder approval requirement may
potentially give disinterested minority shareholders a disproportion-
ate amount of power relative to their shareholding, it is uncertain as
to whether it is appropriate in such circumstances to waive the well-
established concept of majority rule. In addition, there may be cir-
cumstances where it is practically impossible to pass a ratifying
resolution1 3 because all the shareholders are either the wrongdoing
directors themselves or are connected with'" the wrongdoing dir-
ectors. This factual matrix seems particularly likely in small or family-
owned companies. The introduction of the disinterested shareholders'
approval requirement in Hong Kong is thus by no means a straight-
forward matter.
Incidentally, it must also be noted that the proposed provision
requiring disinterested shareholders' approval applies only to the rati-
fication of breaches of directors' duties and not to the authorization in
advance of prospective breaches of duty. The fact that section 239 of
the UK Companies Act 2006 applies to ratification but does not extend
to authorization has been criticized, as it appears odd that the legal
position should be different depending on whether approval was
given by the company on the day before or the day after the breach."
In order to avoid such arbitrary inconsistencies, it is suggested that if
the disinterested shareholders' approval requirement is adopted, that
10 Pursuant to s. 239 of the UK Companies Act 2006, any decision by a company to
ratify conduct by a director amounting to negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust in relation to the company must be made by the members of the
company, and without reliance on the votes in favour of the resolution by the
director (if he or she is also a member of the company) or any member connected
with him or her.
11 Above n. 9, para. 28.
12 See Koh, above n. 1.
13 J. Payne, 'A re-examination of ratification' (1999) 58(3) CI 604.
14 The detailed proposed rules in respect of what constitutes an entity connected with
a director may be found in cl. 11(2) read with cl. 10.22(5d) of the draft Companies
Bill in the First Phase Consultation of the draft Companies Bill (17 December 2009).
15 See Davies, above n. 1 at 583.
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it be extended in Hong Kong to also include the authorization in
advance of prospective breaches of duty.
ii. The Effect on the Statutory Derivative Action
In the event that the disinterested shareholders' approval idea is
eventually grafted into the Hong Kong law of ratification as a con-
sequence of the recent company law reform efforts, the consequential
question would then be what effect this should have on the statutory
derivative action.
It is suggested that the addition of the disinterested shareholders'
approval element would appear to sit strangely with the Hong Kong
statutory derivative action in its current form. The effect of approval
or ratification by members of a company on the bringing of a statut-
ory derivative action in Hong Kong is markedly different from the
position in the UK. In Hong Kong, the approval or ratification by the
members of any conduct does not have the effect of preventing a
member from bringing a statutory derivative action or requiring the
court to refuse leave for the derivative action to be brought. 6 How-
ever, the court may, after having regard to various matters in respect
of the members who approved or ratified the relevant conduct, take
into account the approval or ratification in deciding what judgment or
order to make in respect of the derivative action. These factors include
the extent of the members' independence of the conduct when they
approved or ratified it, how well-informed about the conduct they were
when deciding whether to approve or ratify it, and whether they were
acting for proper purposes having regard to the interests of the speci-
fied corporation when they approved or ratified it.17
Therefore, the present position in Hong Kong is that ratification
would not necessarily prevent a statutory derivative claim from being
brought. The fact of ratification is merely one factor to be considered
by the court in deciding whether to grant leave to commence the
statutory derivative action. Given that at present (as earlier dis-
cussed), an errant director who is also a member generally may vote
in his capacity as member in respect of the ratification of his
own breach of duty as director, this must necessarily be the case. If
the present position were that ratification was an automatic bar to the
availability of the statutory derivative action, in a situation where
the errant director controlled or was himself a majority shareholder,
minority shareholders would then have no access to the statutory
derivative action.
However, if the proposal involving confining ratification only to
disinterested shareholders is indeed adopted in future, it is suggested
that the statutory derivative action in Hong Kong should correspond-
ingly be amended such that ratification by disinterested shareholders
16 168BF(1) of the Companies Ordinance.
17 Section 168BF(2) of the Companies Ordinance.
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bars the possibility of a statutory derivative action. This would be in
line with section 263(2)(c)(ii) of the UK Companies Act 2006, which
provides that permission for the derivative action must be refused if
the court is satisfied that the act in question has been ratified by the
company since it occurred. If an act by a director has been ratified
with disinterested shareholders' approval, the argument that a dis-
gruntled minority shareholder should still be allowed to pursue a
derivative action is much less strong. To allow derivative actions in
such circumstances would arguably be to expose the company ex-
cessively to frivolous claims.
Incidentally, pursuant to section 263(3)(c) of the UK Companies Act
2006, in considering whether to give permission to continue the deriv-
ative action, the court must take into account whether an act that had
not yet occurred could and would be likely to be authorized by the
company before it occurred, or ratified by the company after it oc-
curred. It is suggested that this provision should similarly be
adopted in Hong Kong, as it would appear to be a pertinent factor in
deciding whether the statutory derivative action should be granted.
As a side point, an interesting observation may be made in relation
to the meaning of the term 'ratification'. The traditional understand-
ing of ratification is that it puts directors in a position where they are
treated as not having breached their duty to the company. It should
thus follow, from a purely conceptual perspective, that once ratifica-
tion has been effected, a company (either 'voluntarily' or via a deriv-
ative action) should not be entitled to sue the director. However, this is
not the position under the current statutory derivative action frame-
work in Hong Kong, where (as earlier discussed) ratification does not
bar a statutory derivative action but is merely one of the factors to be
considered by the court in deciding whether to grant leave for the
derivative action to be brought. Thus under Hong Kong law at pres-
ent, a company (via statutory derivative action) can still sue a director
despite the fact that their breach was ratified. This highlights the
nuanced, complex and somewhat confusing meaning of the term 'rati-
fication'. Given that the term can be misleading and is subject to much
historical baggage, it may be useful for subsequent statutory formula-
tions to avoid the use of the term altogether, and instead spell out in
plain and less ambiguous language what kind of resolution would bar
a statutory derivative action or would have impact on the availability
of the statutory derivative action. Indeed, it may be observed that a
similar approach has been taken in the context of the fiduciary obliga-
tions of directors. The general duties of directors are listed in Chapter
2 of Part 10 of the UK Companies Act 2006, rather than relying on the
18 Similarly under s. 263(3)(d) of the UK Companies Act 2006, the court must take into




nebulous concept of 'fiduciary'. 9 As Sir Peter MVillett once observed,
we 'should direct our efforts, not to finding a definition of the concept
of "fiduciary", but to defining the characteristics of the various fiduci-
ary relationships'.2 0 This appears to have been the approach in rela-
tion to the general duties of directors under the UK Companies Act
2006. It is suggested that a similar approach may be taken in the
relation to the law on ratification of breaches of directors' duties.
iii. Matters to be Considered in Examining Ratification
In Hong Kong at present, the court may take into account the ratifica-
tion by members in deciding whether to grant leave to commence the
derivative action, after having regard to three matters in respect of
the members who approved or ratified the relevant conduct. These
three factors are the extent of the members' independence of the
conduct when they approved or ratified it, how well-informed about
the conduct they were when deciding whether to approve or ratify it,
and whether they were acting for proper purposes having regard to
the interests of the corporation when they approved or ratified it.2'
The first of these three factors (namely the independence of the mem-
bers) would be addressed by the proposed disinterested shareholders'
approval requirement. The remaining two factors, however, merit
closer attention.
In relation to the issue of how well-informed about the relevant
conduct the shareholders were when deciding the question of ratifica-
tion, it is suggested that this should prompt legislative stipulation that
the directors whose conduct is being considered are required to pro-
vide full information to shareholders, in order for there to be effective
ratification.
The third factor (namely, whether shareholders were acting for
proper purposes having regard to the interests of the corporation) is
much more complex. At present in Hong Kong, this is merely a factor
to be considered by the court in deciding whether to allow the deriv-
ative action. The question is whether the bar should be raised higher,
such that the fact that the shareholders were not acting for proper
purposes having regard to the interests of the company renders
the ratification ineffective. This has a flavour of imposing a limited
fiduciary duty on shareholders towards the company. It has been
suggested that the shareholders' decision as a whole should be exam-
ined to determine whether the ratification is in the company's best
interests.2 2
However, there are serious complications in adopting a rule that
ratification is ineffective if the voting shareholders viewed as a whole
19 Although this concept is still used in the context of the civil consequences of
breach of the general duties under s. 178 of the UK Companies Act 2006.
20 P. Millett, 'Equity's place in the law of commerce' (1998) 114 (Apr) LQR 214.
21 Section 168BF(2) of the Companies Ordinance.
22 Above n. 13.
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did not act for proper purposes in the interests of the company. First,
there is uncertainty as to which entity would constitute the company
under such circumstances. In the context of directors' duties in Hong
Kong, it has been observed that the position is that directors must act
in good faith in the best interests of the company, meaning that a
director owes a duty to act in the interests of all its shareholders,
present and future23 (i.e. the shareholder primacy principle). While the
shareholder primacy principle is logically coherent in the context of
regulating the conduct of directors, the application of this principle
seems somewhat circular and unhelpful if what is being regulated is
the voting conduct of shareholders themselves.
Another alternative would be to adopt the enlightened shareholder
value approach as enshrined in section 172 of the UK Companies Act
2006. However, the recent Hong Kong law reform Consultation Con-
clusions24 indicate that the notion of enlightened shareholder value
had received only limited support in Hong Kong, and it thus appears
unlikely that such an approach would be adopted in Hong Kong.
In addition, given that the general rule is that members are entitled
to vote even if they have a personal interest in the subject matter that
is different from the interests of the company,25 it is hard to see on
principle why there should be a departure from this general rule
where the question is one of ratification of a breach of directors' duty.
For these reasons it is suggested that the failure by shareholders to
vote in the best interests of the company should not determine the
question of whether there has been effective ratification in Hong
Kong.
IV. Authorization by Non-interested Directors
In discussing the issue of ratification, a related question is whether
non-interested directors should be empowered to authorize directors'
breaches of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, as provided for in
section 175 of the UK Companies Act 2006. The obvious fear in this
regard is that directors may be less than vigilant in authorizing each
others' breaches of duty.
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the authorization by the board for
breaches of directors' duty to avoid conflicts of interest should be
introduced in Hong Kong. The fear of directors indiscriminately
authorizing breaches must be balanced by the fact that such author-
izations would be governed by directors' fiduciary duties. In addition,
allowing directors the power to authorize breaches of duty in certain
23 Principle 1 of the Guide on Directors' Duties issued by the Companies Registry.
24 Consultation Conclusions on the Rewrite of the Companies Ordinance (relating to
Company Names, Directors' Duties, Corporate Directorships and Registration of
Charges) dated 10 December 2008, para. 20.
25 Above n. 8.
8
REFORMING RATIFICATION
instances is arguably more consistent with the modern view26 that the
general meeting and the board are both organs of the company each
deriving authority to exercise corporate powers from the articles,
rather than the more traditional perspective that the board is some-
how subject to the superior control of the general meeting.27 More-
over, executive directors who are concerned with the running of the
company would arguably often be in a better position than minority
shareholders to consider whether a particular act by a director ought
to be authorized. (In contrast, however, it has been argued that the
question of whether to forgive a director is not one within the ordin-
ary business of the company,18 and thus not one that would neces-
sarily be best decided by directors.)
If provisions for the authorization of breaches of directors' duty to
avoid conflicts of interests are indeed introduced in Hong Kong, it
is suggested that such board authorization should bar a minority
shareholder from bringing a statutory derivative action. The issue of
authorization for breaches of directors' duty is inextricably tied to the
right to bring a statutory derivative action. To provide that breaches
of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest can be authorized by the
board but yet that derivative actions may be brought despite such
authorization would seem to strip the authorization of much of its
significance, as well as being conceptually incoherent.2 9
V. Non-ratifiable Breaches
The common law principles relating to the scope of non-ratifiable
breaches has been the subject of much academic debate.30 In particu-
lar, there has been much discussion as to how to reconcile the appar-
ently conflicting cases of Cook v Deeks" and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v
Gulliver.3 2 The principle of non-ratifiable breaches is commonly
formulated as stating that the majority of shareholders may not pass a
resolution in order to expropriate to themselves company property,
and thus a resolution to ratify a director's breaches of duty which
would contravene this principle generally would not be effective.33
The underlying basis for the principle of non-ratifiable breaches
appears to be the protection of minority shareholders as well as
creditors.
26 As reflected in John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113.
27 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461.
28 See Koh, above n. 1.
29 It must also be noted that s. 175(4b) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest is not infringed if the matter has been
authorized by the directors.
30 See Koh, above n. 1 and Davies, above n. 1 at 586.
31 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554.
32 Above n. 2.
33 See Davies, above n. 1 at 586.
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However, if the disinterested shareholders' approval element is in-
troduced to the law of ratification in Hong Kong, this would effect-
ively give disinterested minority shareholders a greater voice, and
consequently the rationale behind the principle of non-ratifiable
breaches would be substantially weakened. In the light of this, there
appears to be much less reason to require the courts to scrutinize the
nature of the transaction to see if it falls within the hazy ambit of the
principle of non-ratifiable breaches.
In respect of protecting the interests of creditors, it is suggested
that there are far more direct ways of protecting their interests (such
as relying on the principles of unfair preference), rather than trying
indirectly to protect the interests of creditors using the nebulous con-
cept of non-ratifiable breaches. Given the extensive and continued
uncertainty as to the scope of the principle of non-ratifiable breaches,
it is thus suggested that the principle be abolished by statute.
As discussed above, ratification is already a factor to be considered
in deciding whether leave should be granted for a statutory derivative
action in Hong Kong. If the suggestion in this paper that ratification
by disinterested shareholders should bar the statutory derivative
action is adopted, then the need to clarify the concept of ratification
and particularly to rid it of the problematic concept of non-ratifiable
breaches is even stronger. One of the criticisms of the UK derivative
action is that the retention of the concept of ratification (as one of the
bars to the derivative action) results in the question of whether there
has been an effective ratification dominating the application for
leave.34 In order to avoid similar problems in Hong Kong it is thus
important that the concept of ratification be properly clarified, and a
simple and effective first step in this regard would be to abolish the
notion of non-ratifiable breaches. The need for certainty and predict-
ability in relation to the question of what constitutes effective ratifica-
tion cannot be overstated.
VI. General Observations in Respect of the Codification of
Common Law Principles
This examination of the recent law reform efforts in Hong Kong relat-
ing to ratification is a useful springboard to wider observation about
the effects of codification of common law principles and the diverg-
ence in company law regulation between England and Hong Kong.
Where the law on a particular issue is governed by case law prin-
ciples rather than by statute in both England and Hong Kong, Hong
Kong benefits from a wide pool of English cases, which serves as a
useful supplement to the body of case law in Hong Kong. In turn, the
34 A. Reisberg, 'Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About
Nothing?' in J. Armour and J. Payne (eds), Rationality in Company Law: Essays in
Honour of D.D. Prentice (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2009).
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scope of influence of English law is effectively widened beyond its
formal borders. For example, this mutually beneficial phenomenon
may be historically observed in the context of the common law deriv-
ative action.
What then is the effect of legislative law reform which often takes
the form of at least partial codification? Codification has been said to
increase the exportability of law, as a code is more accessible than
volumes of case law. 3 5 Moreover, one of the merits of transplanting a
branch of a country's laws is that the transplantation carries with it
influence, and expands the scope of the country's laws beyond its
boundaries. 36 On a more pragmatic note, the lawyers of the 'exporting
country' will benefit from the legal advice that will often be sought
from them in relation to the transplanted provisions.3 ' A shared com-
mon legal framework also promotes mutual understanding which is
conducive for business. If the partial codification of the law of ratifica-
tion of breaches of directors' duties (as contained in section 239 of the
UK Companies Act 2006) is eventually adopted in Hong Kong, this
would then serve as another example of the transplantation of legis-
lative provisions.
Nonetheless, the increased use of legislation as a means of legal
development does in fact have disadvantages in terms of exportability
and influence, which are particularly pronounced when other coun-
tries choose not to adopt the new legislative provisions. For instance,
the statutory derivative action in Hong Kong differs from the English
model in various significant ways." The implication of this for Hong
Kong is that, where the statutory provisions in Hong Kong differ from
the UK, the pool of English cases that are directly relevant for Hong
Kong would be correspondingly diminished. This in turn has the
effect of diminishing the scope of influence of English case law (and
consequently English legal literature) in Hong Kong. It is thus clear
that legislative law reform and codification does not always lead to
increased exportability and influence.
Incidentally, another area in which this may be clearly observed is
in the context of directors' duties. In Hong Kong, it was recently
considered premature to codify comprehensively the fiduciary duties
of directorS39 and consequently most of the codified directors' duties
in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the UK Companies Act 2006 will not be
adopted in Hong Kong. The limited exception to this is that the duty of
care, skill and diligence is proposed to be statutorily formulated along




38 The development of the statutory derivative action in Hong Kong is discussed in
detail in P. Von Nessen, S.H. Goo and C.K. Low, 'The Statutory Derivative Action:
Now Showing Near You' (2008) 7 JBL 627.
39 Above n. 24 at para. 20.
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the lines of section 174 of the UK Companies Act 2006.40 Moreover,
various provisions in the UK Companies Act 2006 depart from the
common law position, such as the new enlightened shareholder value
approach in section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 which (as
earlier discussed) received limited support and is thus most unlikely to
be adopted in Hong Kong."' In the light of this, English cases that
interpret the codified directors' duties in the UK Companies Act 2006
are generally likely to be less persuasive in Hong Kong, given that
Hong Kong would not have a similar legislative framework for dir-
ectors' fiduciary duties.
This is thus another instance of how codification may have the
effect of reducing influence. While greater reliance on legislation and
codification of common law principles may at times result in greater
exportability in the sense that a country's laws are more accessible to
other countries, it may also result in a lessening of influence if other
common law countries choose not to adopt the relevant statutory
provisions.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has considered the recent law reform proposals in Hong
Kong in relation to the ratification of breaches of directors' duties, and
also suggested several further reforms. This discussion has also pro-
vided a platform from which to consider some of the consequences of
codification of common law principles and the divergence in company
law principles between two common law jurisdictions, namely Eng-
land and Hong Kong. It is hoped that the suggestions in this paper
will promote greater coherence and clarity in the law relating to the
ratification of breaches of directors' duties.
40 Above n. 24 at para. 24.
41 This is discussed in J.L. Yap, 'Considering the Enlightened Shareholder Value
Principle' (2010) 31(2) The Company Lawyer 35.
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